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BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO U.S. INVESTMENT  
IN VIETNAM’S REAL ESTATE MARKET 
Stephanie L. Strike† 
Abstract: Despite great progress in Vietnam’s general investment environment, 
barriers exist which impede U.S. investment in Vietnam’s real estate market.  While 
Vietnam remains a socialist country, drastic liberalization of its market structure and 
investment laws have made Vietnam a more attractive environment for most U.S. 
investors.  However, barriers remain for U.S. investors seeking to invest in Vietnam’s 
real estate, specifically property developers wishing to build tourism complexes.  These 
barriers include weak transportation infrastructure, financial and humanitarian issues 
posed by site clearance, and lack of accountability in the real estate licensing system.  To 
facilitate U.S. investment in Vietnam’s real estate, Vietnam should strategically target 
transportation infrastructure projects and improve infrastructure financing schemes; 
decrease the issues posed by site clearance through increased government participation; 
and increase accountability in its licensing system by reconciling the conflicting 
ideologies of the local and national governments and by reducing corruption.  With 
implementation of such changes, Vietnam may attract greater U.S. investment in its real 
estate market.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Vietnam’s Quang Ninh province, tourism has boomed.1  In 2002 the 
number of tourists in Quang Ninh increased thirty-six percent over 2001,2 
and another ten percent from 2002 to 2003.3  One million of these tourists 
were foreigners,4 drawn to the beautiful landscape and convenient location 
close to the Vietnam-China border.5  Capitalizing on this tourism boom, 
Hong Kong investors have pledged to invest US$36 million to build a resort, 
including a five-star hotel, eighteen-hole golf course, and other tourism 
oriented facilities, in the region.6 
Early in Vietnam’s socialist history, the United States and its investors 
refused to economically deal with Vietnam.  Over the past twenty years, 
reforms to Vietnam’s investment laws created an environment generally 
attractive to U.S. investors.  Today, Vietnam’s overall economy is seeing 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Veronica Taylor.  
1
 See Vietnam-Korean JV Invests $7.3MLN in Building in Ha Long City, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS, 
Jan. 28, 2005. 
2
 Quang Ninh Receives 2.3MLN Visitors in 2002, Up 36% On-Year [sic], VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS, 
Dec. 27, 2002. 
3
 Hong Kong Firm to Build $36MLN Resort in Northern Vietnam, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS, Dec. 
21, 2004. 
4
 Mostly from China, Europe, and ASEAN countries. Id. 
5
 See id. 
6
 Id. 
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great success with healthy U.S. investment.  With implementation of recent 
reforms, including the new Common Investment Law, largely formulated 
with the intent to satisfy the United States’ trade interests, U.S. investment in 
Vietnam’s general investment market may increase further.  
However, many U.S. investors believe that barriers remain which 
impede their participation in Vietnam’s real estate market.  Much of Vietnam 
is plagued by weak transportation infrastructure, creating difficulties for 
tourists attempting to travel from one attraction to the next.7  Property 
developers avoid investing in areas where strong infrastructure is not 
available to facilitate their projects.8  The financial9 and humanitarian issues 
that investors face from site clearance pose another barrier to U.S. 
investment.  Lack of undeveloped land means that many development sites 
are already occupied and must undergo site clearance, which requires 
relocating and compensating present occupants prior to construction.10  Site 
clearance can be costly both from potential development delays and 
compensation to occupants.  A third major obstacle is the lack of 
accountability in Vietnam’s licensing scheme.11  Vietnam’s national licensing 
scheme, which supports foreign investment, is often undermined by its 
implementation at the local level.12  Additionally, corruption pervades the 
government authorities' administration of Vietnam’s real estate licenses.13 
While these barriers all may impede U.S. investment in Vietnam’s real 
estate, reforms can be made to create a more appealing environment.  
Vietnam should target the development of transportation infrastructure, 
create successful financing schemes, alleviate the difficulties associated with 
site clearance through increased government involvement, and resolve the 
lack of accountability in its real estate licensing system posed by disparate 
governmental goals and corruption. 
Part II of this Comment will briefly outline Vietnam’s general 
investment environment, past and present.  Part III will analyze the barriers 
which U.S. investors believe remain to investment in Vietnam’s real estate 
                                           
7
 See Vietnam Still Unattractive to French Tourists, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS, May 18, 2005. 
8
 See Thien Nhan, Sound Infrastructure Vital to Developing Thu Thiem, THE SAIGON TIMES DAILY, 
Apr. 6, 2000. 
9
 See VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, Business, Joint Donor Report to the Vietnam 
Consultative Group Meeting, Dec. 6-7, 2005, at 82. 
10
 Id.; see also HCM City Short of Land for Investors, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS, Mar. 3, 2004 (Ho Chi 
Minh City is likely to face a shortage of land for investors in the near future). 
11
 See infra Part III.C. 
12
 See Luke Aloysius McGrath, Vietnam’s Struggle to Balance Sovereignty, Centralization, and 
Foreign Investment Under Doi Moi, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2095, 2098-99, 2108 (1995). 
13
 See Vietnam: Reasons for Bullishness, GLOBAL NEWS FUND, Dec. 19, 2005, at 9(1) v. 11. 
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market.  Part IV presents suggestions for how Vietnam may effectively break 
down these barriers. 
II. VIETNAM’S GENERAL INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT SUPPORTS U.S. 
INVESTMENT 
Vietnam’s real estate investment environment is impacted, in no small 
way, by the overall investment environment in Vietnam.  While Vietnam 
remains a socialist country, drastic liberalization of its market structure and 
investment laws have made Vietnam a more attractive environment for many 
U.S. investors.14  Vietnam initiated a drastic economic restructuring in 1987, 
largely in order to attract foreign investors.15  In recent years, Vietnam’s 
efforts intensified leading to reforms, such as the new Common Investment 
Law, which make Vietnam’s investment environment even more attractive to 
U.S. investors.16  Today, Vietnam’s economy is flourishing17 with the support 
of foreign investment in many economic sectors.18 
A. Historically, Vietnam Provided an Investment Environment 
Unattractive to U.S. Investors 
Historically, U.S. investors avoided any type of investment in 
Vietnam.  Following the United States’ involvement in Vietnam from 1961-
1975,19 its economic relations with Vietnam were strained.  Vietnam 
reunified into a single country in 1976,20 adopting socialism, a highly 
invasive economic scheme under which the State, not the market, controls 
the economy.21  With Vietnam’s adoption of socialism, the United States 
imposed economic isolation on Vietnam22 as a means to pressure economic 
reform.23  In order to preserve good relations with the United States, other 
                                           
14
 See David Dollar & Borje Ljunggren, Vietnam, in GOING GLOBAL: TRANSITION FROM PLAN TO 
MARKET IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 439, 448 (Padma Desai, ed., 1997). 
15
 See Magali Matarazzi, Selecting a Corporate Form: Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam’s Oil 
and Gas Industry under the 1995 Land Law, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 364, 367 (1999); Laura A. 
Malinasky, Rebuilding With Broken Tools: Build-Operate-Transfer Law in Vietnam, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 438, 438 (1996). 
16
 See New Laws Help Accelerate Vietnam’s Accession to WTO, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Jan. 24, 
2006. 
17
 See Vietnam Targets US$6BLN in FDI in 2006, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 9, 2006. 
18
 See Vietnam Attracts US$1.3BLN in FDI in Two Months, ASIA PULSE, Feb. 27, 2006. 
19
 United States State Department, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: 
Vietnam (2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4130.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2006). 
20
 Malinasky, supra note 15, at 440. 
21
 Geoffrey Murray, Vietnam: Dawn of A New Market 21 (1997).  
22
 Pamela L. Polevoy, Privatization In Vietnam: The Next Step in Vietnam’s Economic Transition 
From a Nonmarket to Market Economy, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 887, 902 (1998). 
23
 McGrath, supra note 12, at 2108-09. 
860 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 3 
 
industrialized nations followed suit, leading to Vietnam’s economic isolation 
from nearly the entire international community.24  
The United States’ isolation tactic proved effective, forcing Vietnam’s 
government to implement quasi-market economic reforms by the mid-
1980s.25  A particularly significant piece of reform was the Foreign 
Investment Law (“FIL”), passed in 1987.26  The FIL sought to infuse foreign 
investment dollars27 into Vietnam’s desperately struggling domestic 
market.28  The FIL proved remarkably successful,29 with foreign investors 
taking advantage of the new investment opportunities in Vietnam’s 
increasingly open market.30  By the mid-1990s, Foreign Direct Investment 
(“FDI”) accounted for more than one third of Vietnam’s Gross Domestic 
Product (“GDP”).31 
Following the FIL, the United States moved closer toward 
establishing normal economic relations with Vietnam.32  Significant U.S. 
investment in Vietnam rapidly ensued.33  The United States now constitutes a 
major source of foreign investment in Vietnam.34  Many experts expect the 
interest of U.S. investors to continue to grow as the Bilateral Trade 
Agreement (“BTA”) with the United States becomes fully implemented35 
and Vietnam accedes to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).36 
                                           
24
 With the exception of the communist nations of Eastern Europe. See Polevoy, supra note 22, at 
902. 
25
 See Norman Brown IV, The Long Road to Reform: An Analysis of Foreign Investment Reform in 
Vietnam, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 97, 97 (2002). 
26
 Matarazzi, supra note 15, at 367; Malinasky, supra note 15, at 438. Further reforms to the FIL 
occurred in 2000 that allowed foreign investors to mortgage their land-use rights. Brown IV, supra note 25, 
at 100. 
27
 Throughout this Comment, foreign investment refers to foreign direct investment (“FDI”). FDI is 
the reinvesting of foreign profits into a foreign nation’s economy. FDI may aid developing economies by 
increasing capital available for investment. Brown IV, supra note 25, at 99. 
28
 See id. at 97. 
29
 From 1988-1993, Vietnam’s GDP growth was higher than at any period since reunification.  
DOLLAR & LJUNGGREN, supra note 14, at 448; contra Goodnight, Vietnam, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2000 
(circa 2000, foreign investment had fallen below 1992 levels). 
30
 See DOLLAR & LJUNGGREN, supra note 14, at 448. 
31
 Goodnight, Vietnam, supra note 29. 
32
 McGrath, supra note 12, at 2109. 
33
 See Polevoy, supra note 22, at 910. 
34
 See McGrath, supra note 12, at 2099. The United States was Vietnam’s largest investor in 2004. 
Report Shows US to be Largest Investor in Vietnam in 2004, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Feb. 24, 2006. 
35
 After the BTA was initially implemented, Vietnam increased exports to the United States by 450% 
over one year. U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement is a Stepping Stone Toward the WTO, VIETNAM NEWS, Dec. 
15, 2004, http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/2004-12/14/Stories/17.htm (interview with Steve Parker, 
director of the STAR-Viet Nam project). 
36
 See id.; Thai Thanh, Foreign Funds Target Ambitious, SAIGON TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 20, 2006; 
NZ Concludes WTO Negotiations With Vietnam, NEW ZEALAND PRESS ASSOCIATION, Jan. 25, 2006. 
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Recent reforms to Vietnam’s investment laws resulted from efforts to 
implement the BTA and gain accession into the WTO.37  Since the signing of 
the BTA in 2000, Vietnam has modernized its legal and judicial systems, 
improved the transparency of its legislative and administrative procedures, 
and enhanced its dispute resolution process.38  Successful implementation of 
the BTA is considered a stepping stone to Vietnam’s accession to the WTO 
since much of the BTA is built upon WTO principles.39 
B. Vietnam’s General Investment Environment Today Is Conducive to 
U.S. Investment 
After years of economic reform, Vietnam’s investment environment is 
now conducive to general investment from the United States.  In 2005, 
Vietnam’s economy was stronger than it had been in nearly a decade, and 
forecasts for 2006 indicate that Vietnam’s economic strength will continue 
into the future.  Bright projections are further supported by the passage of 
the Common Investment Law,40 which successfully alleviates many former 
investment concerns of U.S. investors.41 
1. Vietnam’s General Investment Environment Appears Strong 
Vietnam’s economy is flourishing.42  In 2005, Vietnam’s economy 
experienced healthy growth in its GDP, 43 with year-on-year growth of thirty 
percent.44  FDI inflows45 reached an eight-year high,46 contributing fifteen 
percent of the GDP.47  Vietnam’s GDP growth is now the second fastest in 
Asia.48  
                                           
37
 U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement is a Stepping Stone Toward the WTO, supra note 35. 
38
 Id. 
39
 See id. 
40
 Law 59-2005-QH11 on Investment. 
41
 New Laws Help Accelerate Vietnam’s Accession to WTO, supra note 16. 
42
 Vietnam Economic Fruits From International Integration, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Jan. 26, 2006 
(FDI has become one of the most important capital sources for the country’s development, helping speed 
up the restructuring of its economy towards industrialization and modernization). 
43
 Amy Kazmin, Rapid Vietnam Growth ‘Likely to Continue,’ FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006, at 10. 
44
 Vietnam Targets US$6BLN in FDI in 2006, supra note 17. 
45
 Most foreign investment in Vietnam has been in the manufacturing and tourism arenas from 
Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea. See Taiwan Implements 1,408 Projects in Vietnam, ASIA 
PULSE, Jan. 9, 2006. 
46
 Almost US$4 billion of 2005 FDI went to fund 771 newly-licensed FDI projects. Vietnam Targets 
US$6BLN in FDI in 2006, supra note 17. 
47
 FDI Firms Honoured at VN Forinvest, VIETNAMNET, Nov. 3, 2005, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/ 
biz/2005/11/507536. 
48
 Behind China. NZ Concludes WTO Negotiations With Vietnam, supra note 36. 
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Forecasts for 2006 indicate that Vietnam’s investment environment 
will remain strong.  According to the Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, Vietnam will yield more than US$6 billion in FDI in 2006,49 a 
twenty-nine percent increase over 2005.50  FDI investment51 was up twelve 
percent in January 2006 against the same period in 2005.52  The United 
States is one of the biggest investors, with most capital going into real 
estate.53 
Another reason to believe that Vietnam will continue to see strong 
FDI is that developed nations are trying to diversify their investment risks 
beyond China to countries such as Vietnam.54  Many of Vietnam’s new 
investors have moved their operations from China due to concerns about 
economic and political uncertainty in that country.55  As a result, foreign 
investment in Vietnam has increased, with FDI dollars rising to the level of 
popular investment destinations such as India.56   
Many in the international community are encouraged by these positive 
economic forecasts.  The World Bank Country Director for Vietnam, Klaus 
Rohland, has stated that in the next five years, Vietnam will shift from low-
income to middle-income.57  Vietnam hopes to shed its poor-country status 
by 2010.58   
2. Vietnam’s New Common Investment Law Encourages U.S. Investment 
Vietnam’s new Common Investment Law, which will come into effect 
in July 2006,59 marks a major step toward addressing key concerns of U.S. 
investors.60  The Common Investment Law has been described as an 
“extremely important bill for the investment environment in Vietnam, which 
has a direct and immediate impact on all investors and all investment 
                                           
49
 Vietnam Targets US$6BLN in FDI in 2006, supra note 17. 
50
 New capital expected to come mostly from northeastern Asian countries, especially Japan. 
Foreign Investment to Rise with New Law, ASEM CONNECT, Dec. 23, 2005, 
http://www.asemconnectvietnam.gov.vn/detail.aspx?id=7230 . 
51
 South Korea, Japan and Taiwan were the biggest investors, especially in the real estate market. 
Vietnam Attracts US$444 MLN FDI In Jan., ASIA PULSE NEWS, Jan. 25, 2006. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Vietnam Attracts US$1.3BLN in FDI in Two Months, supra note 18. 
54
 Investors Look Beyond China, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006; see also George Wehrfritz,  
Vietnam Revs Up, NEWSWEEK INT’L, Nov. 28, 2005. 
55
 Wehrfritz, supra note 54. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Rethinking the Five-year-plan, VIETNAMNET, Oct. 14, 2005, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/news/ 
2005/10/500094. 
58
 Id. 
59
 New Laws Help Accelerate Vietnam’s Accession to WTO, supra note 16. 
60
 Id. 
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activities in the economy.”61  Under the new law, investors’ rights are 
protected by an article prohibiting the government from forcing investors 
into certain market-unfriendly activities.62  This provision is a shift from the 
past, when government dictates trumped market demands.63  In addition, 
Vietnam shifted its policy from one that outlawed anything not explicitly 
permitted, to one that permits investment in all sectors, industries, and trades 
not prohibited by law.64  
The Common Investment Law further benefits investors by 
streamlining administrative procedures.65  By reorganizing administrative 
procedures to require only a single investment-business license,66 the 
business license registration process is expected to be much quicker than in 
the past.67  Investors can complete all the necessary paperwork online, 
confirmed by electronic mail, without going to a registration body.68  
Vietnam’s drastic economic and investment reforms have generally 
made Vietnam a more attractive environment for U.S. investors.69  Recent 
reform efforts, including the new Common Investment Law, alleviate many 
of the former concerns with investment in Vietnam held by potential U.S. 
investors.70  The strong investment environment in Vietnam today further 
supports foreign investment in many economic sectors. 
III. BARRIERS PERSIST WHICH IMPEDE U.S. INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM’S 
REAL ESTATE 
Despite Vietnam’s improvements to its general investment laws, 
barriers persist for U.S. investors seeking to invest in Vietnam’s real estate 
market.  Property developers interested in developing tourism complexes are 
particularly affected by weak transportation infrastructure, issues posed by 
                                           
61
 Investment Law: Unfavourable for [sic] More Favourable?, VIETNAMNET, Nov. 7, 2005, 
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/biz/2005/11/508703. 
62
 Tran Anh Duc & Jesse Lieberman, Laws to Provide Equal Footing for Investors, TALKING LAW, 
Dec. 28, 2005, http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/showarticle.php?num=01TAW281205. 
63
 See generally id. (new law contains “an article prohibiting the Government from forcing investors 
into certain market unfriendly activities”). 
64
 Id. 
65
 See Vietnam’s Investment Ministry to Give Depts New Licensing Right, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 20, 
2006. 
66
 All Comments on Investment Bill to Be Examined Carefully, VIETNAMNET, Nov. 6, 2005, 
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/biz/2005/11/508413. 
67
 Registration can be completed in seven days. Investment Law: Unfavourable [or] More 
Favourable?, supra note 61. 
68
 See id. 
69
 See generally McGrath, supra note 12 (discussing Vietnamese legal and institutional reforms). See 
also generally Polevoy, supra note 22 (discussing Vietnam’s transition to a market economy). 
70
 See New Laws Help Accelerate Vietnam’s Accession to WTO, supra note 16. 
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site clearance, and a lack of national accountability in the real estate 
licensing system.  
Many of the problems facing potential real estate investors are 
evidenced by Vietnam’s Lam Dong province.  Since 2003, Lam Dong has 
attracted FDI for tourism services.71  However, the number of real estate 
investment projects in the region does not match its potential for 
development.72  Under-investment is due to the barriers facing real estate 
investors, including inadequate funding for infrastructure development, extra 
financial costs from paying local citizens for site clearance, and an overly 
cumbersome administrative process.73  Such burdens have dissuaded some 
potential investors from investing in the province’s real estate.74 
A. Vietnam’s Weak Transportation Infrastructure Dissuades Many U.S. 
Investors from Developing Vietnam’s Real Estate 
Weak transportation infrastructure constitutes a significant hurdle for 
real estate investors in Vietnam.  A recent survey found that about twenty 
percent of investment firms view infrastructure provisions as a serious 
obstacle to the growth and operation of their business.75  Of particular 
concern are transportation infrastructures.76  Many potential investors have 
dismissed certain projects due to the high site-preparation costs associated 
with the poor state of the roads and bridges.77   
The neighboring provinces of Hue and Danang demonstrate how 
infrastructure can affect investment in the tourism industry.  Both the coastal 
provinces of Hue and Danang possess significant natural assets to attract 
tourism.78  However, the two differ greatly in the availability of land with 
suitable infrastructure.79  Danang provides much better access to roads.80  In 
2003, Danang spent about sixty percent more per capita than Hue on large 
                                           
71
 See Vietnam Lam Dong Strives to Improve Investment Environment, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Jan. 
9, 2006. 
72
 Id. 
73
 See id. 
74
 Id. 
75
 See VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 98. 
76
 See id. at 99; Mai Anh, Low Labour Costs Lure Korean Firms, VIETNAM INV. REV., Jan. 2, 2006, 
at 7(1) (Korean investors face difficulties with the weaknesses of Vietnam’s infrastructure, including road 
systems and electricity supply). 
77
 Thien Nhan, supra note 8. 
78
 VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 140. 
79
 See id.. at 141. 
80
 Id. at 140. 
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investment projects.81  As a result, Danang has attracted more FDI82 and “is 
one of the most popular tourist destinations in Central Vietnam.”83   
Strong transportation infrastructure is particularly important to 
potential investors in tourism-friendly real estate.  Vietnam’s most attractive 
tourism destinations are spread widely across the country, making accessible 
transportation to and from these destinations a key component of successful 
tourism ventures in Vietnam.84  However, Vietnam’s transportation 
infrastructure has been particularly slow to improve. 85  For example, after 
twenty years of reform, Vietnam has yet to build a national expressway 
consistent with international standards.86 
Vietnam’s national government has made some improvements to its 
transportation infrastructure.87  For instance, Vietnam’s Prime Minister has 
approved a project to build an inner-city railway route in Ho Chi Minh 
City.88  The Prime Minister also approved a project to build an expressway89 
in Quang Ninh to enhance the province’s tourism industry.90 
Vietnam is also working to improve its aviation sector.  It hopes to 
become the fourth largest aviation market in the region by 2025.91  
Improvements chiefly include upgrades to airport facilities and ground 
services.92  The aviation sector has increased its passenger transport capacity 
from little more than 1 million in 1990 to 13 million in 2005.93 
Problems in Vietnam’s infrastructure remain, however, and the 
resources to rectify them are scarce.  Vietnam has attempted to locate 
resources for infrastructure projects in a variety of ways, including issuance 
of infrastructure bonds, partnerships with the private sector, and dependence 
on local governments.94  Although some of these attempts have produced 
success, these methods are not as effective as they could be.  The 
                                           
81
 Id. at 141. 
82
 Accumulated investment by foreign companies is three times higher in Danang than in Hue. Id. at 
141. 
83
 Tien Dat, Discounts to Attract Customers, SAIGON TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 20, 2006. 
84
 See Vietnam Still Unattractive to French Tourists, supra note 7. 
85
 Thai Thanh, Foreign Funds Target Ambitious, SAIGON TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 20, 2006. 
86
 Id. 
87
 See FDI Flows Into Service Sector, VIETNAMNET, Nov. 7, 2005, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/ 
biz/2005/11/508833; VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 98. 
88
 Vietnam PM Approves US$700 MLN Ho Chi Minh City Railway PJT, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 19, 2006. 
89
 Mong Duong-Mong Cai Highway. PM Gives Green Light To Mong Duong-Mong Cai 
Expressway, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS, Apr. 27, 2005. 
90
 Id. 
91
 Asia Aviation, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 6, 2006. 
92
 Id. 
93
 Vietnam’s Aviation Sector to Make Intensive Investment in Infrastructure, THAI PRESS REPORTS, 
Jan. 19, 2006. 
94
 VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 101. 
866 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 3 
 
effectiveness of infrastructure bonds is undermined by competition and 
implementation difficulties.  Private participation has been limited by the 
perceived lack of profitability of infrastructure projects.  Generally, the 
largest responsibility for rural transport infrastructure lies at the local level,95 
and efforts to encourage local governments to fill in the gaps are impeded by 
the lack of national government oversight. 
Vietnam’s government has issued infrastructure bonds for specific 
projects; however, it has found it difficult to raise capital this way.96  Several 
reasons for this difficulty have been suggested.  The first reason relates to 
the relatively low interest rate of the bonds compared to other investments.97  
The second is that local governments, such as those in Ho Chi Minh City 
and Hanoi, are creating competition by also offering infrastructure bonds.98  
Additionally, the federal bonds already face mobilization and disbursement 
problems; only three fourths of planned disbursements were expected to 
occur by the end of 2005.99  Disbursement delays are blamed on complex 
investment procedures, site clearance, and poor supervision.100 
Another way that Vietnam should generate funds for infrastructure 
improvement is through privatization.101  Currently, private participation in 
the transportation sector is quite limited.  With few exceptions102 all toll 
roads currently operational in Vietnam are owned and managed by the 
national and local governments.103  Complex land acquisition procedures and 
difficulty in recovering costs have deterred private investors from 
developing new toll roads.104 
The national government’s difficulty in generating funds for 
infrastructure has led it to encourage local provinces to take greater 
responsibility for financing infrastructure.105  In response, thirteen provinces 
have already established Local Development Investment Funds 
                                           
95
 See THE WORLD BANK, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 
74.1 Million to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for a Third Rural Transport Project, Jan. 25, 2006, at 19. 
96
 Taking Stock: An Update on Vietnam’s Economic Developments and Reforms by the World Bank 
in Vietnam, Consultative Group Meeting for Vietnam, Dec. 6-7, 2005, at 10 [hereinafter Taking Stock]. 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id. at 11. 
99
 Id. 
100
 Id. 
101
 See generally VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 103-04 (transportation, 
ports and railways earn enough revenue to cover their operating expenses). 
102
 In Quang Linh, a private sector company built segments of road in exchange for LUCs along the 
road corridor, a model which has been replicated in other locations.  Id. at 103. 
103
 See id. 
104
 Id. 
105
 Taking Stock, supra note 96, at 31. 
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(“LDIFs”).106  LDIFs are intended to support private participation in 
infrastructure development.107  Support takes various forms, including direct 
financing of projects,108 but thus far, lending constitutes the bulk of LDIF 
activities.109 
Some provinces have already succeeded in raising funds for 
infrastructure development projects.  In 2002, the Quang Ninh province, one 
of the most popular tourist destinations in northern Vietnam,110 spent 
US$54.96 million to upgrade infrastructure in its tourism sites.111  In Thu 
Thiem, additional infrastructure is scheduled to be built in conjunction with 
the development of a new urban center.112  These developments are 
estimated to require at least US$600 million over the first ten years113 and 
will include a subway line and station, bus and waterbus services, and five 
bridges to link the region’s districts.114  
The inadequacy of national regulations pertaining to the 
implementation of LDIFs at the local level has stunted private participation 
in infrastructure development.  In theory, LDIFs allow local governments to 
enter into infrastructure contracts with the private sector.115  However, there 
are no national regulations that govern the operation and functions of 
LDIFs,116 leaving provincial governments with significant discretion over 
LDIF operations.117  This allows local governments to disregard federal 
efforts to encourage private participation.  As a result, direct participation of 
the private sector in infrastructure development remains minimal.118 
B. U.S. Real Estate Investors Face Excessive Financial Risks from Site 
Clearance 
U.S. real estate investors claim that they are discouraged from 
investing in Vietnam’s tourism-friendly real estate due to the excessive 
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financial risks they face from site clearance.119  Unoccupied land available 
for development is scarce, particularly in the most populous areas, such as 
Ho Chi Minh City.120  Thus, new developments often require site clearance 
and compensation for the current occupants.121  Site clearance often results 
in costly delays to development. 122 As a result, businesses sometimes pay 
substantial unofficial fees to decrease the length, and thus the cost, of 
delays.123  Prior to reforms, many investors were unable to implement 
projects due to the difficulties with site clearance.124  According to a survey 
of foreign investors in the services sector, access to land is the most 
important constraint to investment in Vietnam, with twenty-eight percent 
reporting it to be a severe or major constraint.125 
Lack of access to land is of particular concern to real estate investors 
in the tourism industry.  According to many commentators, Vietnam is in 
need of more luxury accommodations.126  The demand for hotel rooms in 
large cities, such as Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, has been very high.127  In 
Hanoi several luxury hotels on occasion have had to turn away fifty percent 
of potential reservations due to lack of available rooms.128  However, in the 
larger cities the supply of available land to develop new hotels is too small 
to meet demand.129  Therefore, investors must clear sites in the city or build 
in the countryside.130 
Reforms to Vietnam’s site clearance regulations have somewhat eased 
the burden that investors face.  Since 2004, regulations require provincial 
governments to provide housing in resettlement zones for households whose 
land has been recovered by the state.131  Moreover, foreign investors are no 
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longer required to pay for site clearance.132  Now, investors only pay for 
their lease on the land and the provincial government covers all resettlement 
and other expenses associated with site clearance.133  If an investor incurs 
such expenses, it can deduct them from the cost of the land-use fees applied 
for the lease.134 
Despite these reforms, site clearance for developments, such as hotels, 
often leads to considerable costs and delays for investors.135  For example, 
the cost of a major road construction project in Ho Chi Minh City rose from 
VND312.3 billion to VND831.6 billion when ninety houses needed to be 
cleared to make room for the project.136  Not only did this delay affect the 
project itself, but it also affected another project under construction in the 
same area.137  In another instance, to build the East-West corridor, Ho Chi 
Minh City had to move 7000 households and 360 offices.138  It took eight 
years of preparation and site clearance before Ho Chi Minh City could begin 
construction.139  Sometimes, by the time construction actually commences 
on a project, investors who previously signed land-leasing contracts have 
already waited years beyond what they had originally expected in order to 
acquire the land.140 
Disagreements with affected occupants over site clearance have 
resulted in considerable delays as well.141  For example, in 2002, a company 
in the Ha Tay province submitted a request to lease 6442 square meters of 
pond land behind the company’s head office.142  The appropriate local 
authorities approved the company’s application in 2004, after two years of 
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consultation and bargaining with the affected households.143  The company 
agreed to pay compensation to the homeowners and contribute money in 
support of infrastructure building.144  However, shortly after approval, local 
residents prevented the company from completing the agreed-upon project 
because they were afraid that the new factory would pollute their stream.145  
The dispute continued despite several new rounds of negotiations and 
assurances by the company that its factory would have a waste filter system 
compatible with international standards.146 
The resolution of site clearance issues is complicated by humanitarian 
issues which often arise regarding the relocation of current land occupants.  
Under Vietnam’s socialist system, the national government holds the land in 
trust for its citizens.147  While taking land for infrastructure projects can be 
considered “in the public interest” under Vietnamese law, lack of 
accountability in the land revocation and compensation systems leads to 
little guarantee that the public will benefit from such projects.148  Some 
projects which result from site clearance may be of some benefit to current 
occupants.149  However, many will also cause a severe detriment to 
citizens.150  Citizens and government entities, including the National 
Assembly, have complained that relocated citizens are not compensated 
fairly or in a timely manner.151 
The humanitarian concerns posed by site clearance are not necessarily 
being addressed by Vietnamese officials.152  In 2003, four people were 
sentenced “to jail terms ranging from 24 to 42 months after they 
disseminated . . . letters denouncing local land clearance policies.”153  Later 
that same year four people were sentenced “to prison terms of 30 to 42 
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months for inciting fellow farmers to voice complaints over provincial land 
use policies.”154 
C. The Lack of Accountability in Vietnam’s Licensing System Undermines 
U.S. Investment in Vietnam’s Real Estate 
A large barrier to investment in Vietnam’s real estate sector is the lack 
of accountability in Vietnam’s real estate licensing scheme.  Vietnam’s 
national licensing scheme is often undermined by its implementation at the 
local level.155 Corruption pervades the government authorities’ 
administration of Vietnam’s real estate licenses.156  The resultant delays in 
the licensing process prove costly to real estate investors.157 
In Vietnam, socialist principles dictate that private individuals have no 
right to own land.158  Instead, the Vietnamese government acts as a sort of 
fiduciary to “the people”159 by exercising its discretion to allocate land-use 
rights (“LUR”) to individuals and entities.160  LURs grant individuals and 
entities the right to use, transfer, or lease a parcel of land for a specific 
period of time.161  
The efficacy of national licensing laws is often undermined by 
interpretations at the local (provincial) level that are inconsistent with the 
national agenda.162  Vietnam’s local authorities exercise “inordinate 
power.”163  LURs are administered at both the national and local level,164 
with local governments playing a central role.165  Ultimate control over LUR 
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legislation and policy is retained at the national level;166  however, local 
authorities167 possess broad discretion to allot land use rights.168  Acting 
independently from the national government,169 local authorities have been 
known to interpret national laws to further local, as opposed to national, 
goals.170  The result is proper real estate titling differing from one province 
to the next.171  
The attitude of public officials toward businesses, and how they 
choose to exercise their discretion as a result, makes an enormous difference 
in the provincial investment climate.172  The ability of investors to get access 
to land and protection from corruption is largely determined by the attitudes 
of local authorities.173  Local licenses can be more or less burdensome, 
depending on the inclination of local authorities toward pursuit of the 
national government’s goals.174 
Local implementation of laws can lead to delays that result in 
significantly increased costs to investors.175  A long waiting period for 
businesses to get their LURs diminishes the desire of U.S. investors to invest 
in Vietnam.  This is true largely because it increases the transaction costs 
investors suffer while waiting to commence business operations.176  In a 
recent survey, seventy-four percent of all firms agreed that if land was easier 
to obtain they would expand business operations. 177  The median time for 
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obtaining an LUR was sixty days, significantly higher than the twenty-three 
days outlined in the law.178  However, in some provinces it can take even 
longer.  In the Ha Tay Province, it has taken as long as ten years to obtain an 
LUR.179 
A 2003-04 survey on economic governance in seventeen provinces in 
Vietnam found that of 488 firms surveyed concerning access to land, only 
forty-four percent received their official LUR certificate;180 only 11.5 
percent had completed the necessary formalities and were in the process of 
receiving their certificates.181  All others were functioning without formal 
title to their land by either sub-letting land from state owned enterprises, 
renting from other private firms, or using informal title not sanctioned by the 
provincial government.182   
Due to the discretionary nature of LUR allotment, corruption 
continues to be a problem in Vietnam’s government.183  According to a 
survey by the ruling Communist Party, more than thirty-two percent of all 
government officials would accept a bribe if offered one.184  The most 
common reason for corruption is the desire to ‘speed up’ bureaucratic 
delays.185  Corruption has a particularly negative effect on real estate 
investors.  Among Vietnam’s most corrupt authorities is the land 
administration agency.186  Thus, land transfer is particularly vulnerable to 
corruption.187 
Vietnam’s political structure allows local officials, or even local 
agencies, to ignore their designated responsibilities in implementing laws.188  
In addition, local tasks and assignment of responsibility and authority are 
inaccurately defined, presenting an opportunity for corruption.189  For 
example, officials have been known to issue decisions allocating lots to 
themselves or to their relatives.190 
Corruption is more prevalent because firms generally avoid 
Vietnamese courts.  The decisions of Vietnamese courts are “considered 
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arbitrary and enforcement mechanisms ineffective.’191  Instead of the courts, 
foreign companies use the privileged access to Vietnam’s government 
afforded them through their business associations and embassies to solve 
disputes.192  Such access increases the opportunities for Vietnamese officials 
to exploit the system by working on their own terms outside of the law. 
Vietnam’s national government must promulgate laws that ensure that 
“those breaking rules have less incentive to pay bribes.”193  One example of 
such a law is the Civil Code amended in 2005, which requires all property 
owners to register non-liquid assets.194  Prior to the new civil law, Vietnam 
lacked property ownership laws, allowing unofficial transactions to control 
the real estate market.195  This provided incentives for those desiring real 
estate licenses to pay bribes.  The recently amended Civil Code attempts to 
counteract that trend.196 
Vietnam’s government has “vowed to reduce corruption.”197  An 
important first step was the law on corruption, approved late in 2005.198  
This new law strengthens accountability by holding senior officials 
“responsible for the prevention and control of corruption” occurring on their 
watch.199  Civil servants and their immediate families may be monitored 
under the law, as well.200  The law specifically targets increased public 
disclosure and transparency in areas relevant to real estate investment, such 
as “public procurement[,] construction activity, . . . [and] management and 
use of land.”201 
The lack of accountability in Vietnam’s licensing system has had a 
negative effect on business.  Title to land increases investment and access to 
credit.202  Real estate investors who do not have a formal license to their land 
are highly limited in their ability to access capital because they are unable to 
use their present land as collateral to other business operations.203  This issue 
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is exacerbated by local government failure to grant LUR “certificates unless 
site clearance and infrastructure are complete.”204 
U.S. investors believe that barriers persist which impede their 
investment in Vietnam’s real estate.205  Vietnam’s weak transportation 
infrastructure, issues with site clearance, and lack of national accountability 
in the real estate licensing system may undermine U.S. investment potential 
in the real estate sector.  
IV. VIETNAM CAN ALTER SOME POLICIES TO FACILITATE U.S. INVESTMENT 
To facilitate U.S. investment in Vietnam’s real estate, Vietnam should 
implement reforms to alleviate barriers identified by U.S. investors.  
Suggested reforms include strengthening the transportation infrastructure, 
decreasing financial risks and humanitarian issues stemming from site 
clearance, and increasing accountability in its real estate licensing system.  
Such reforms would address many of the concerns held by U.S. investors 
and may encourage further investment in Vietnam’s real estate sector. 
A. Vietnam Should Reform Its Laws Affecting Implementation and 
Funding of Transportation Infrastructure Projects 
Vietnam’s infrastructure, particularly in regions ripe for tourism 
development, should be strengthened to smooth the progress of U.S. 
investment in Vietnam’s real estate.  With physical barriers to travel 
decreased, more tourists may venture into and around Vietnam and enjoy 
tourism-friendly real estate.206  To facilitate such development, Vietnam 
should strategically target infrastructure projects and reform its laws 
affecting financing sources, including infrastructure bonds, privatization, 
and local investment. 
Infrastructure spending would most effectively enhance real estate 
investment if used in regions strategically targeted for tourism 
development.207  Successful real estate investment is closely tied to 
successful infrastructure development.208  Strategically targeting 
infrastructure improvement may further the success of infrastructure 
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projects.  Thus, real estate investment would benefit from strategically 
targeting infrastructure development. 
To determine which regions should be strategically targeted for 
tourism development, Vietnam should carry out feasibility studies.  
Feasibility studies should address several issues which are key to successful 
development.  One such issue is whether tourism is likely to flourish in a 
particular region if the infrastructure is strengthened.  Sub-issues might 
include how hospitable local residents might be towards tourists, the 
availability of workers who are properly trained in hospitality, and the 
region’s proximity to other points of interest.  Another issue is whether 
development in the particular region would be the most effective use of 
investors’ capital.  Such a determination should be based on factors such as 
whether investors are likely to recoup their expenses by developing in the 
region, and whether investors could, or perceive that they could, accomplish 
the same for a greater profit elsewhere. 
By strategically targeting infrastructure projects, Vietnam may be able 
to substantially improve transportation in regions targeted for tourism 
development.  Strategically targeting improvements serves to concentrate the 
scarce financial resources available for infrastructure development into 
specific regions either identified as or targeted to become ripe for tourism 
development.  Thus concentrating financial resources reduces the risk of 
spreading scarce infrastructure financing too thinly to allow substantial 
improvements in any one region. 
With concentrated infrastructure improvements, targeted regions may 
be more attractive to real estate investors.  With Vietnam pre-targeting 
regions for development, investors may be less likely to face the initial 
challenges or costs associated with implementing infrastructure development 
on their own.  Infrastructure development often must precede real estate 
development.  With strategically implemented infrastructure development, at 
least some regions will have strong infrastructure.  By concentrating 
infrastructure development in targeted regions investors are likely to face 
less infrastructure development responsibility than if development were 
more widely and thinly spread.  
In addition to merely targeting regions for tourism development, 
Vietnam’s national government also should facilitate infrastructure 
development by strategically implementing policies aimed at promoting 
development.  By implementing such policies, Vietnam may increase 
development in certain regions.  Such policies might include tax incentives, 
reduction in the cost of LURs, and subsidies.  As an example, Vietnam’s 
Prime Minister recently designated the resort island Phu Quoc as a “special 
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investment area.”209  Phu Quoc is considered to have great potential in 
tourism,210 and Vietnam instigated the island’s special designation in “an 
effort to spark development.”211  Investors in sectors including real estate,212 
infrastructure, and tourist services will benefit from preferential investment 
and land use policies.213 
Reforming financing sources for infrastructure development may also 
improve infrastructure development, and consequently may improve the 
chances for U.S. real estate investment.  The success of infrastructure 
projects financed through bonds should be enhanced by improving project 
evaluations.214  Attracting private participation in infrastructure development 
is another way that Vietnam may increase infrastructure financing.  
Reducing corruption in locally implemented projects is also important. 
Improving bond project evaluations should enhance the success of 
infrastructure projects financed through bonds.215  Improved evaluations 
may allow common obstacles associated with infrastructure development, 
such as clearing infrastructure sites216 and low traffic flow, to be identified 
and avoided.  It may also assist in identifying alternate locations for 
infrastructure projects where such obstacles are less onerous. 
Vietnam should also improve infrastructure financing through 
attracting private participation.  Private participation can be drawn to the 
area through “promoting competition” within the private sector.217  This may 
be achieved by implementing a transparent and honest bidding scheme. In 
addition to promoting competition, Vietnam should improve investors’ 
confidence in the ability to recoup their expenses on infrastructure 
investments.218  One way to increase investor confidence in the ability to 
recoup expenditures may be to conduct project appraisals assessing the 
traffic volume, and thus the likely profit, from transportation investment 
projects.  This is similar to the feasibility study. 
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Reducing the risk of corruption in LDIFs is another issue that Vietnam 
should address.  One way that Vietnam may be able to reduce corruption is 
to ensure that LDIFs are operated independently from the provincial 
governments.219  Vietnam may also benefit from strengthening LDIF 
regulations at the national level220 and improving the transparency of these 
regulations.221  
B. Vietnam Should Conduct Strategic Site Clearance in Order to 
Decrease the Excessive Financial Burdens and Humanitarian 
Concerns Associated with Investors Conducting Site Clearance 
Provinces should strategically implement site clearance and set aside 
land designated for development in order to increase access to land for real 
estate investors.222  Vietnam may be able to ameliorate some of the excessive 
financial burdens and humanitarian issues associated with investors 
conducting site clearance by conducting site clearance on its own prior to 
luring investors.  It currently takes an average of 231 days for an investor to 
acquire land from the government.223  The length of this process is a result of 
needing to clear the land of all current occupants and issue compensation to 
resettle the current occupants.224  It is likely that this waiting period could be 
drastically reduced if land were set aside and cleared by the government 
ahead of time.225 
To increase the effectiveness of government-conducted site clearance, 
site clearance must be strategically implemented by Vietnam in areas likely 
to attract investors.226  As with strategically targeting areas for infrastructure 
development, Vietnam can determine which areas are likely to attract 
investors by carrying out feasibility studies.  Such studies should focus 
heavily on the issue of whether tourism is likely to flourish in a particular 
area.  Thus, the sub-issues of how hospitable local residents might be 
towards tourists, the availability of workers who are properly trained in 
hospitality, and the area’s proximity to other points of interest should be 
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examined.  The study should also determine whether developing in the area 
will maximize investors’ capital. 
Humanitarian concerns may also be addressed by conducting strategic 
site clearance.  Vietnam is more attuned to the needs of its citizens than are 
U.S. investors.  Therefore, the concerns of Vietnam’s citizens will likely be 
better addressed by their own government, rather than U.S. investors.  
Vietnam may be able to work within its own country and with its own 
citizens to identify regions ripe for tourism development which will have the 
least negative impact on its citizens.  
In instances where the government is unable to set aside and clear 
land ahead of time, it should take a more involved role in site clearance to 
ease the burden on investors and citizens.  A recent example is the popular 
foreign investment project in the Thu Thiem Peninsula where 10,000 
households are expected to be displaced by development.227  To reduce the 
burden on investors, the city government is expected to negotiate with the 
inhabitants to acquire land for the project and has said it will directly issue 
compensation to those households affected.228 
C. Vietnam Should Increase the Accountability of Real Estate Licensing 
Authorities 
Increasing the accountability of real estate licensing authorities may 
improve U.S. investment in Vietnam’s real estate.  In order to increase 
accountability, Vietnam should shore up local support and implementation of 
national real estate licensing policies.  In addition, Vietnam should 
implement and properly execute laws aimed at breaking down the rampant 
corruption currently present in Vietnam’s real estate licensing system.   
Vietnam should implement laws that encourage local governments to 
support the real estate investment goals of the national government.229  
Practical concerns require that local governments play a central role in the 
actual implementation of the national government’s real estate licensing 
policies.  Thus, local governments are likely to retain a high degree of 
discretion concerning to whom and how these licenses are distributed.  The 
challenge for the national government, therefore, is to encourage local 
governments to use their discretion in ways that support the national 
government’s goals. 
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Vietnam’s national government should implement laws that will 
encourage local governments to align their policies with the national goals.  
The key is for the national government to implement policies that attract 
local support, thus bringing local goals more in line with national goals.  A 
system of incentives to local governments could accomplish this.  For 
example, the national government could implement laws that reward local 
authorities for furthering the goals of the national licensing scheme.230  
Rewards might include providing subsidies to local public works projects 
and promoting investment in the region. 
Such a system of incentives may also persuade local public officials to 
exercise their discretion in conformity with national goals.  Through a 
system of incentives, local public officials may be more likely to promote 
national policy goals.  Incentives could include promoting local officials 
who succeeded in issuing licenses in a timely manner.231  An expedited 
licensing process is likely to result, thus decreasing the burden of costly 
delays that investors currently face. 
Vietnam should also engage in reforms aimed at reducing corruption.  
Reforms should focus primarily on local governments and local government 
officials who are responsible for administering the real estate licensing 
system at the local level.  Additionally, while Vietnam is unlikely to make 
significant reforms to its judicial system in the foreseeable future, judicial 
officers who engage in corrupt activities should be influenced by anti-
corruption laws. 
Vietnam’s current system should be reformed such that the cost to 
local officials who engage in corrupt activities outweighs the benefit.  
Increased costs should take the form of dependable sanctions.  Sanctions 
could include reduction in pay, demotion, fines, or imprisonment.  To be 
effective, these sanctions must be consistent and proportional to the corrupt 
action. 
While the imposition of sanctions is essential to an anti-corruption 
strategy, additional methods are necessary to effectively reduce 
corruption.232  To accomplish Vietnam’s goal of reducing government 
corruption it is necessary to reduce the discretion of government officials.233  
One way to decrease such discretion while minimizing invasive national 
oversight would be to increase the role of fixed computer programs. 234  
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Fixed computer programs should be written by the national government and 
then given to the local governments to use when assessing a license 
application.  If used properly, such a program may increase transparency and 
ensure accountability, two important components of reducing corruption.235 
While Vietnam has implemented a new anti-corruption law, its 
efficacy depends on the way it will be implemented.  The new law is more 
comprehensive than typical anti-corruption legislation, which also leads to 
“implementation challenges.”236  To resolve these implementation 
challenges, conventional wisdom dictates that implementation should be 
phased in. 237  For instance, asset declaration should be particularly focused 
on the most corruption-prone agencies and senior officials first.238  This 
strategy of “low coverage but close scrutiny”239 may decrease the risk of 
overwhelming the inspector, thus diluting the law’s efficacy.240  
V. CONCLUSION 
Vietnam’s investment environment has come a long way toward 
attracting U.S. investors.  With several additional reforms, U.S. investors 
may find Vietnam’s real estate a particularly attractive investment.  
Vietnam’s current investment market is generally attractive to U.S. investors, 
with the overall economy experiencing significant growth.  Vietnam’s 
tourism industry is likewise growing.  However, many U.S. investors believe 
that barriers remain which impede investment in Vietnam’s real estate 
market. 
One barrier identified by U.S. investors is Vietnam’s weak 
transportation infrastructure, which often makes travel difficult for tourists 
hoping to enjoy Vietnam’s widespread attractions.  Additionally, Vietnam’s 
small land area and dense population create a lack of access to land, leading 
investors to face the financial and humanitarian issues associated with site 
clearance.  Potential real estate investors believe that insufficient local 
implementation of national goals and inherent corruption further undermine 
real estate investment ventures. 
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Vietnam has the opportunity to address U.S. investors’ concerns by 
implementing reforms.  Vietnam should create a financing scheme to 
facilitate targeted infrastructure development.  Difficulties associated with 
site clearance may be diminished by Vietnam’s creation of designated 
tourism zones.  The lack of accountability created by the inefficient 
delegation of responsibility and corruption in its licensing system should be 
reduced through increased transparency and a system of rewards for 
compliance.  Implementation of these reforms may create a more appealing 
environment for U.S. real estate investors. 
